Is multi-factor authentication enough to secure Microsoft 365?
No. ASD rates MFA as one of the most effective controls and recommends phishing-resistant methods such as security keys or passkeys. ASD also describes attackers who steal authentication token values to impersonate a user after MFA, so legacy authentication, app consent, forwarding and token binding need settings of their own.
In detail
ASD places multi-factor authentication in the Essential Eight and calls it one of the most effective controls an organisation can implement against malicious actors gaining access to online services, systems or data repositories. Its guidance is phishing-resistant MFA for all online services, systems and data repositories, because methods that rely on SMS messages or voice calls are weaker.
The maturity model sets the floor. At Maturity Level One the factors are something users have and something users know, or something users have that is unlocked by something users know or are. At Maturity Level Two the MFA used by users of online services and systems is phishing-resistant, and successful and unsuccessful MFA events are centrally logged.
ASD describes the strongest form as a factor that uses public key cryptography and is physically separate from the device, such as a security key, or a private key held in a device's Trusted Platform Module and unlocked by a memorised secret or biometrics, which is how passkeys and Windows Hello for Business work.
The maturity model's Maturity Level Three describes malicious actors circumventing stronger MFA by stealing authentication token values to impersonate a user. Microsoft's Token Protection binds sign-in session tokens to the registered device, so a stolen token cannot be used from another device.
| Gap | Setting |
|---|---|
| Legacy protocols that cannot do MFA | Block legacy authentication with Conditional Access; Microsoft's analysis puts more than 97 per cent of credential stuffing and more than 99 per cent of password spray attacks on legacy authentication |
| A malicious app the user consented to | Allow user consent only for applications from a verified publisher, with administrator consent for the rest |
| Inbox rules that forward mail outside the organisation | The automatic forwarding report lists users who forward to external recipients; then set automatic forwarding to off in the outbound spam policy, which stops user inbox rules and mailbox forwarding |
| A stolen sign-in session token | Token Protection in Conditional Access, which accepts only device-bound sign-in session tokens, such as Primary Refresh Tokens, for Exchange Online, SharePoint Online and Teams native apps |
| Weak MFA on a sensitive resource | An authentication strength that allows only phishing-resistant methods for that resource |
Conditional Access, and with it authentication strengths, needs a Microsoft Entra ID P1 licence; a tenant without one can block legacy authentication with security defaults.
The privileged access rules of the Essential Eight apply to the tenant's administrators: a dedicated privileged account used solely for privileged duties, kept off the internet, email and web services unless explicitly authorised to reach online services, and a separate privileged operating environment. Microsoft recommends excluding emergency access accounts from Conditional Access policies, against lockout by a misconfigured policy.
- Filter the sign-in logs by client app for legacy protocols, and open the automatic forwarding report.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators through an authentication strength.
- Block legacy authentication with a Conditional Access policy, report-only first, break-glass excluded, then on; or security defaults.
- Require MFA for every user, then move everyone to the phishing-resistant authentication strength Maturity Level Two requires.
- Restrict user consent to applications from verified publishers.
- Set automatic forwarding in the outbound spam policy to Off.
- Where one partner needs forwarded mail, set the policy to On and block every other external domain through remote domains.
- Turn on Token Protection where the platform and the applications support it.

For an Australian organisation
For an Australian organisation the measure is the multi-factor authentication strategy of the Essential Eight: Maturity Level One for MFA on the organisation's own and third-party online services that hold its sensitive data, Maturity Level Two for phishing-resistant MFA and central logging of MFA events.
ASD states there is no requirement for an Essential Eight implementation to be checked by an independent party, though an independent assessment may be required by a government directive or policy, a regulatory authority or a contract.
Sources
- ASD, Implementing multi-factor authenticationRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- ASD, Essential Eight maturity modelRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- Microsoft, Block legacy authentication with Conditional AccessRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- Microsoft, Configure how users consent to applicationsRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- Microsoft, Control automatic external email forwarding in Microsoft 365Read 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- Microsoft, Token Protection in Microsoft Entra Conditional AccessRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
- Microsoft, Conditional Access authentication strengthsRead 31 Oct 2026, opens in a new tab
