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    Multi-factor authentication, from sensitive services to every data repository.

    Essential Eight multi-factor authentication at Maturity Level One

    At Maturity Level One, the Essential Eight requires multi-factor authentication on every online service, the organisation's own or a third party's, that holds its sensitive data, and on online customer services holding sensitive customer data, for staff and customers alike.

    Multi-factor authentication uses either: something users have and something users know, or something users have that is unlocked by something users know or are.

    Australian Signals Directorate, Essential Eight maturity model, Appendix A

    What Maturity Level One requires

    Maturity Level One is aimed at attackers using commodity tradecraft, such as signing in to an online service with credentials that were stolen, reused, brute forced or guessed. The strategy answers with seven requirements. Six say where a second factor is needed, and the seventh limits which combinations of factor count.

    For staff, the second factor is required on the organisation's own online services that hold its sensitive data, and on third-party online services that hold that data. On a third-party service holding only non-sensitive data, it is required wherever the service offers it.

    Online customer services carry the remaining coverage requirements. Staff signing in to customer services that hold sensitive customer data use a second factor, whether the organisation runs the service or a third party does. Customers signing in to those services use a second factor too.

    Two shapes of factor are accepted. The first is something the user has, such as a one-time code generator or an authenticator app, presented with something they know, such as a password. The second is something the user has that is unlocked by something they know or are, such as a cryptographic device opened with a PIN.

    What an assessor asks to see

    ASD's assessment process guide ranks evidence in four grades. Testing a control with a simulated activity is excellent evidence, reviewing live configuration in the system's interface is good, a report or screenshot of it is fair, and a policy or a verbal statement is poor.

    For this strategy, the assessor attempts to sign in to each in-scope service and watches for the request for a second factor. The guide also tells assessors to look for other sign-in portals exposed to the internet, since an organisation may present only its primary portal.

    Where a third-party service has no second factor, the assessor confirms that the vendor does not offer one. For customer services, the assessor asks whether the second factor is set up when the account is created or left to the customer afterwards. The assessor also asks how the organisation tells multi-step sign-in apart from multi-factor.

    Risk acceptance cannot stand in for the whole strategy. An exception needs its scope and justification written down, compensating controls with a review date, the residual risk accepted by an appropriate authority, and a fresh decision within a year. If any one requirement is assessed ineffective, the organisation cannot claim the level.

    Where organisations fall short

    The commonest gap is a sign-in portal left off the list. A secondary web portal or a vendor console exposed to the internet can sit outside the policy that protects the main portal, and the assessor is told to look for exactly that.

    Third-party services are the next gap. A service that offers a second factor but has it switched off fails the requirement, and ASD's guide treats leaving it off to avoid user complaints as a reason to withhold the level.

    A biometric used alone does not count, because it is not a secret and matching is probabilistic. A rule that waives the second factor for a known location or a managed device relies on trusted signals, which can be spoofed. Two secrets entered one after another make a multi-step sign-in that fails the factor rule.

    Customer services and evidence are the last two gaps. A customer portal that lets customers skip the second factor misses a Level One requirement. A policy document saying multi-factor authentication is enforced is poor evidence, so the configuration and a test sign-in need to back it up.

    Meeting it in Microsoft 365 and Azure

    In a Microsoft 365 tenant, Microsoft Entra ID handles sign-in for Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, OneDrive and Microsoft Teams, and for third-party services connected to it by single sign-on. An Entra ID Conditional Access policy that requires multi-factor authentication for all users and all cloud apps covers that set in one place.

    The authentication methods policy in Microsoft Entra ID decides which factors users may register. Microsoft Authenticator, FIDO2 security keys and Windows Hello for Business meet the Level One rule, and the last two are also phishing-resistant, as Level Two requires. A tenant that retires SMS codes early removes a method ASD's guide flags as a target for social engineering.

    Conditional Access conditions that skip the second factor for a named location or a managed device rely on trusted signals and fail at this level. Any break glass account left out of the policy needs a documented exception with compensating controls. Third-party services outside single sign-on need their own setting switched on, with a dated screenshot kept.

    In an Azure estate, the Azure portal and other management interfaces sign in through Microsoft Entra ID, so a Conditional Access policy targeting all cloud apps covers them. Customer applications hosted in Azure need their own second factor for customers. Log Analytics or Microsoft Sentinel can hold the sign-in logs now, ahead of the Level Two logging requirement.

    Where Level One sits on the ladder

    Maturity Level One is the first target level for this strategy. Below it sits Maturity Level Zero, which records that the Level One requirements are not met. ASD expects every strategy at the same level before the next is targeted, and an assessment against Level Two waits until Level One has been demonstrated.

    Maturity Level Two extends the second factor to privileged and unprivileged users signing in to systems, makes it phishing-resistant for users of online services and systems, offers customers a phishing-resistant option, and logs every successful and failed authentication centrally.

    Maturity Level Three adds users of data repositories and makes phishing-resistant authentication mandatory everywhere, customers included. ASD's guide notes that organisations planning for those levels may choose phishing-resistant methods, such as security keys, smart cards or passkeys, from Level One.

    Dates

    When it was written, and checked.

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    Questions, answered.

    Does an SMS code count as multi-factor authentication at Maturity Level One?

    Yes. A code sent by SMS to a phone is something the user has, and with a password it meets the Level One factor rule. ASD's assessment guide suggests moving away from SMS codes and push notifications, which attackers target with MFA fatigue and social engineering, and Level Two requires phishing-resistant methods.

    Do customers need multi-factor authentication at Maturity Level One?

    Yes, on any online customer service that holds sensitive customer data, whether the organisation runs it or a third party does. An assessor signs in as a customer and asks whether the second factor is set up when the account is created or left for the customer to enable.

    What if a third-party service has no multi-factor authentication?

    For non-sensitive data, the requirement applies only where the vendor offers it, and the assessor confirms it is unavailable. For sensitive data the requirement has no such condition, so the gap needs a documented exception with compensating controls, approved by an appropriate authority and reconsidered within a year.

    Does a fingerprint count as a second factor?

    Not on its own. ASD does not accept biometrics as a factor at Level One, because a biometric is not a secret, matching is probabilistic, and it relies on capture software on the device. A fingerprint can unlock another factor, such as a certificate held in a Trusted Platform Module or a code generator app on a phone.

    Provenance

    Sources, and when they were read.

    Every source was read 11 Nov 2026.

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