Optimizely Web Experimentation flaw used to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects
Report URI says the code swapped crypto wallet addresses and skimmed cards typed into sites' own forms, and that a restrictive script-src was what separated the 24 protected sites it checked from the rest.
Threat intelligence
18 Nov 2026
Lead source Optimizely, Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 November 2026)
What Optimizely has confirmed
Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, taken steps to secure affected accounts and added protections.
Report URI says the attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, served from Optimizely's CDN. It says 188 snippets across 178 organisations were infected, Australian sites among them: Vodafone Australia, TPG Telecom, HSBC Australia and Betashares. John Walsh, Field CTO at IGEL, told Newsweek the 178 organisations represent potentially affected websites rather than confirmed breaches.
The timeline
Report URI says it first saw an Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on 16 November and that a card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes were out of its reach, it says. It says the code also sent cookies not marked HttpOnly and screenshots to the attacker.
Report URI says all infected Optimizely files were cleaned by 23:11 UTC on 16 November. Optimizely posted its statement at 01:02 UTC on 17 November.
The lesson for a finance firm
Report URI advises any site with card fields in its own forms to treat cards entered on 16 November as potentially exposed. ISM-2063 asks web application session cookies to set the HttpOnly flag by default.
PCI SSC says PCI DSS Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 aim to ensure payment page scripts are properly authorised, checked for integrity and monitored for tampering. If card details or session tokens may have been taken, an entity suspecting an eligible data breach must take all reasonable steps to assess it within 30 days.
- Search all Project JavaScript and custom code, self-hosted snippets too, for 1688360.cc and atob(, as Report URI advises
- Rotate credentials for Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations, then non-HttpOnly session tokens, as Report URI advises
- Block 1688360.cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, eil786npto9u5bq.icu, webshell.lol and every domain Report URI lists as attacker-owned, including subdomains
- Set a Content-Security-Policy, as ISM-1424 asks. Report URI advises restricting connect-src and avoiding 'unsafe-eval' where you can
Sources
- PrimaryOptimizely, Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 November 2026)Retrieved 18 Nov 2026
- PrimaryAustralian Signals Directorate, Information Security Manual: Guidelines for software developmentRetrieved 18 Nov 2026
- PrimaryAttorney-General's Department, Privacy Reform consultation paperRetrieved 29 Oct 2026
- SecondaryReport URI, World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely (updated 17 November 2026)Retrieved 18 Nov 2026
- SecondaryPCI SSC, New Information Supplement: Payment Page Security and Preventing E-Skimming (10 March 2025)Retrieved 18 Nov 2026
- SecondaryNewsweek, Hackers plant malicious code on websites of 178 organisationsRetrieved 18 Nov 2026



